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In the last two years a significant number
of books and articles have appeared on the
subject of guerrilla warfare. As the military
component of Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s
wars of &dquo;national liberation,&dquo; guerrilla war-
fare promises to receive more sustained at-
tention by writers than that recently given
the &dquo;national purpose.&dquo; On the other hand,
Peking’s strategy in the nuclear age is a
topic that is just beginning to receive public
attention and one that authors will be con-
sidering with growing concern and emphasis
for many years ahead. Although guerrilla
warfare and nuclear warfare are poles apart
they are interrelated both in Communist
military considerations and in noncommu-
nist efforts to cope with them.
In many respects Communist China’s
Strategy in the Nuclear Era stands as a
model for comparable attempts. It also
illustrates the difficulties involved in trying
to write on such a topic. Although the
author has made excellent use of available
sources and has benefited from the advice
of colleagues in The RAND Corporation, the
outsider can never be certain of the actual
thinking of the decision-makers in Peking.
How would Mao Tse-tung, for instance,
react to this book? In addition, the time ele-
ment always enters into the equation, for the
outlooks of the Chinese Communist leaders
have been influenced by changes on the
domestic front, in the distribution of world
power, and in the field of technology. The
large number of variables renders even more
difficult any attempt to analyze how Peking
will behave in the international community
once it becomes a nuclear power in terms of
an atomic arsenal and delivery capacity.
These considerations, however, do not de-
tract from the need for scholarly but im-
aginative study of one of the increasingly
important challenges in world politics. The
final product of the author’s painstaking
research and sound methodology is indica-
tive of what can be achieved in the face of
the many obstacles.
Mrs. Hsieh has organized her book around
three integrated topics reflecting a chrono-
logical approach: the first chapter considers
the disparagement of nuclear arms by the
Chinese Communists, 1945-1954, the sec-
ond traces the increasing awareness by Pe-
king of the implications of nuclear conflict,
1954-mid-1957, and the third, appropriately
called the &dquo;search for decision,&dquo; continues
the study to the cut-off date of July, 1959.
Two addenda deal with Peking’s military
thinking as of January, 1960 and changes in
its military leadership as of September,
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1959. At the time the preface was written,
October, 1961, the author indicates that
subsequent developments had produced &dquo;no
important modification of the argument.&dquo;
Her concluding chapter of six pages should
be read by all students of world politics
even if they do not have the time to read the
rest of the book. As for those who want to
pursue the subject in depth, the author’s
meticulous footnoting and selected bibliog-
raphy are very helpful. Seven pages devoted
to nineteen leading men in the People’s Re-
public with thumbnail sketches of their mili-
tary interests and outlook add to the value
of the book.
Throughout the study Mrs. Hsieh stresses
the military relationships between Peking
and Moscow drawing conclusions on the
basis of the available evidence. These rela-
tionships, in turn, she indicates, condition
the posture Communist China can and
does adopt toward the United States. Her
handling of the crisis in the Taiwan Strait in
1958 is especially well done. She concludes
that &dquo;as of early 1960 it appeared, despite
indications of friction in the Sino-Soviet
relationship, that the key to China’s military
moves in the Far East, insofar as they
might directly involve United States inter-
ests, remained in Moscow&dquo; (p. 186). If
this assumption is accepted, the Soviet
Union is in a position to exercise real mod-
eration on Communist China’s foreign policy.
Although Moscow carefully keeps exclu-
sive control over the use of its arsenal of
nuclear Weapons, Peking still has various
means at its own disposal in an effort to
attain its national objectives that do not call
for a direct confrontation between the two
great nuclear powers. The danger in the
situation, of course, lies in the possibility
that a war of &dquo;national liberation&dquo; or even a
&dquo;limited war,&dquo; especially in Southeast Asia,
involving the United States and the People’s
Republic, might escalate to a world conflict
in which the nuclear threshold is quickly
crossed. Peking has given evidence of taking
greater risks and probing more deeply along
its part of the Sino-Soviet periphery than
Moscow. It may well be argued that Pre-
mier Nikita Khrushchev, despite his monop-
oly of nuclear weapons in the Communist
world, intervened in Laos through the Soviet
airlift in order to prevent, at least for a
while, the People’s Republic of China from
taking action that might lead to a general
conflagration. At the same time the United
States by placing less stress on massive retali-
ation and by building up a greater capability
for limited war with conventional weapons
is seeking to cope with the Communist
threat in some areas and the reality of indi-
rect aggression in others. These considera-
tions do not weaken the basic conclusions of
Mrs. Hsieh but they point up the dangers
involved in an explosive situation conducive
to escalation.
The author gives brief attention to how
Peking may &dquo;exploit varying degrees of
nuclear capability.&dquo; This subject, of course,
deals with the intangibles of the future, but
because of its importance, merits a book of
its own. Because Mrs. Hsieh has already
made such a solid contribution in Communist
China’s Strategy in the Nuclear Era, it is
hoped that she will give emphasis in a sub-
sequent study to Peking’s role as a nuclear
power.
Communist Revolutionary Warfare by
George K. Tanham can be read with profit
in conjunction with Mrs. Hsieh’s contribu-
tion. The author has focused on the military
aspects of the Vietminh of Ho Chi Minh in
Indochina during the war against the French.
Although most of the book deals with the
past, the implications for the present coun-
terinsurgency effort on the part of the Re-
public of Viet Nam and the United States in
Viet Nam south of the seventeenth parallel
are clear-cut. Developments in Laos and
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Viet Nam since 1959, it might be pointed
out, have already led to the appearance of a
large number of special courses in various
military and civilian institutions associated
with the United States government on the
political, economic, social, and military as-
pects of insurgency and counterinsurgency.
Tanham has organized his study around
the topics of the Vietminh’s military doc-
trine, organization, personnel and logistics,
operations and tactics, and reactions to the
tactics and air power of the French. A
chapter on military developments since the
Geneva Conference on Indochina in 1954
by Anne M. Jonas is included. The final
chapter and epilogue point up the lessons
for the present. The author who did most
of his research in France includes a five-
page bibliography of books, pamphlets, peri-
odicals, and bulletins. Although the study
as a whole is not so carefully integrated as
that by Mrs. Hsieh, it is well worth reading.
Tanham’s chapter on the development of
Vietminh military doctrine stresses the roles
of Mao Tse-tung and Vo Nguyen Giap.
Cited are the former’s Strategic Problems of
China’s Revolutionary War and On Pro-
tracted War and the latter’s The War of
Liberation and the Popular Army. Tanham
skillfully analyzes the thinking of the two
Communist leaders indicating Giap’s appli-
cation of Mao’s ideas to revolutionary war-
fare in Indochina. The record from 1945 to
1954 clearly indicates that Vietminh mili-
tary doctrine was well formulated in an
effort to achieve Communist objectives.
The author puts considerable emphasis on
the point that &dquo;in Vietminh theory-as in all
Communist theory and practice-political
and military aims are intertwined and insep-
arable, with the political objective taking
precedence over the military at all times&dquo;
(p. 140). He notes that the political conse-
quences of the French defeat at Dien Bien
Phu were far more grave than the military
and indicates that the Vietminh leaders
accurately foresaw French reaction to the
setback. In terms of the present crisis
Tanham draws attention to the systematic
efforts of the Vietminh to paralyze the gov-
ernment of President Ngo Dinh Diem by
cutting it off from political contacts at the
local level. At the same time the author
realistically observes that until Diem &dquo;has
the active and continuing support of the
Vietnamese masses and the troops, all the
economic and military aid in the world,
though it may delay it, will not halt the
Communist advance&dquo; (p. 157).
The observation just made needs to be
stressed in the current conflict in South Viet
Nam. Short-term military gains, for instance,
by giving adequate mobility to the superior
firepower of the government forces, may be
lost if long-term measures to win active
popular support for the Saigon authorities
fail. Indeed, the application of modem
technology and tactics to guerrilla warfare
may already be outdistancing the political,
economic, and social efforts in counterin-
surgency. But how can the United States
accomplish its objective of defeating the
Vietcong in South Viet Nam through the
government of President Ngo Dinh Diem?
What are the limitations of American pres-
sure for needed reforms on him and his
associates in Saigon? On the one hand,
Washington must be careful lest it find
itself in the position of Paris prior to the
Geneva settlement of 1954. The South Viet-
namese themselves, it is certain, have the
greater stake and must bear the brunt of the
struggle in their own self-interest. On the
other hand, a noncommunist alternative to
the leadership of Diem may possibly present
more problems than now exist. The margin
of influence that the United States has in
the Republic of Viet Nam through its exten-
sive military and economic aid programs
must be exploited to the utmost in the inter-
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est of common objectives and endeavors.
Tanham in his concluding chapter draws
attention to the role of Communist China as
a sanctuary in the final victory of the Viet-
minh over the French. &dquo;There can be no
doubt whatever,&dquo; he says, &dquo;that China’s
interest in supporting the revolutionaries,
coupled with the common border, was a
strong contributing-if not the decisive
factor in the success of the Vietminh&dquo;
(p. 144). In broader terms, it might also be
stated that the use of a Communist sanctu-
ary for mounting, directing, and in part sup-
plying guerrillas in an adjacent area against
an established, widely recognized govern-
ment constitutes a form of indirect aggres-
sion. The international community has not
yet been able to face up to the realities of
this challenge and to take steps to cope with
it. By keeping the tempo of the aggression
at a relatively low pitch, the Communists
are able to prevent the clear-cut establish-
ment of aggression under international law
and to sow discord among allies who might
be prepared to check it. At the present time
North Viet Nam is a sanctuary for such
aggression against South Viet Nam, as indi-
cated in the findings of the International
Commission for Supervision and Control in
1962, while Laos may continue to afford
access for the Vietcong despite the neutrality
arrangement concluded in the same year at
the International Conference on the Settle-
ment of the Laotian Question.
Tanham in his case study has succeeded
not only in giving the reader an excellent
analysis of Communist revolutionary war-
fare in Indochina from 1945 to 1954 but
also in providing him with valuable insights
on the present. It is hoped that the great
attention now being given in Washington to
insurgency and counterinsurgency will bear
dividends in the jungles, swamps, and moun-
tains of Viet Nam.
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